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Abstract
Understanding how capital flows within rural communities in sub-Saharan Africa can provide
important insights on the nature of poverty and the effectiveness of financial intermediation.
We use unique individual level savings and borrowing data to study the flow of funds within a
sample of 104 Ugandan savings groups. We show that poor households borrow from wealthier
households, which implies that the marginal benefit of money is decreasing in wealth. Other
individual characteristics do not predict the flow of funds within the group. We also fail to
detect evidence that members are using savings groups to smooth out occupation-specific
income shocks.
JEL classification: G21; O16.
Keywords: rural financial markets; savings groups; poverty.
1 Introduction
Financial intermediation is useful when members of a community are heterogeneous
in the returns on the investment opportunities available, in the types of income shocks
faced, or in their attitude toward risk. Furthermore, several important theories claim
that the efficiency of this intermediation is an important determinant of the persistence
of poverty.1 In the presence of severe credit-market frictions, only sufficiently wealthy
households borrow and engage in high-return projects requiring large upfront invest-
ments. Poor households self-insure against income shocks by saving, or are not active
in the credit market preferring to deploy their own resources in activities requiring
∗We acknowledge the financial support of USAID (through project SCORE), CERGE-EI Founda-
tion under a program of the Global Development Network (Regional Research Competition), Central
European University (Research Support Scheme).
†Department of Economics, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR 97403-1285, USA, bur-
lando@uoregon.edu.
‡Economics and Political Science Area, INSEAD, Boulevard de Constance, 77300 Fontainebleau,
France; andrea.canidio@insead.edu.
1 See the literature on poverty traps, in particular Banerjee and Newman (1993), Galor and Zeira
(1993), Mookherjee and Ray (2003), among others.
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little or no initial investment. As a consequence, they remain poor if these shocks are
large or these activities yield low returns. On the other hand, when the credit market
functions sufficiently well or high-return projects do not require large upfront invest-
ments, poor households can smooth out income shocks, invest in high-return projects
and catch up with richer households over time. In this case, in a closed economy we
should observe poorer households borrowing from wealthier households who already
exploited high-return projects or are less risk averse.2
In light of these theories, the flow of funds generated within a village economy
has important implications for our understanding of poverty. In this paper, we study
the flow of funds generated within a specific local financial institution: savings groups
(SGs). Members of an SG pool savings within the group, borrow from the group at
an interest, and receive a return on their savings. SGs facilitate financial flows within
local communities, and have received a lot of attention from policy makers in the
past decade. For instance, the Gates Foundation has provided significant resources to
Catholic Relief Services, CARE International, and Oxfam to develop such groups in
sub-Saharan Africa3. Consequently, membership in SGs reached 10.5 millions people
worldwide in 2014, a tenfold increase relative to 2008, and continues to climb. There is
evidence from randomized trials that participation in savings groups is beneficial (see
Beaman, Karlan, and Thuysbaert, 2014, Ksoll and Forskningsenhed, 2013, Bundervoet,
2012), but financial flows within savings groups have not yet been studied.
This paper aims at filling this gap. We use detailed individual level information
among members of 104 SGs in Uganda to study how their initial characteristics corre-
lates with their borrowing and saving choices. We find that, within groups, wealthier
members save more than poorer members but that they do not borrow more. This
means that, on average, the relatively rich lend to the relatively poor. Furthermore,
we show that initial wealth is negatively correlated (weakly) with the net borrowing
position at every wealth level, so that poorer households borrow weakly more than
slightly less poor households. Controlling for wealth, we find that farmers are more
likely to be net lenders, but gender, income and other individual characteristics are
uncorrelated with the net borrowing position. We also seek evidence that financial
flows provide risk sharing across different occupations present in the group. Our es-
timates are inconclusive, suggesting either that occupation-specific income shocks are
not very large relative to idiosyncratic income shocks, or that frictions at the group
2 Under additive shocks and standard CRRA utility functions, when faced with a similarly sized
income shock, standard theory predicts that the rich will let their consumption vary by more relative
to the poor.
3 See https://docs.gatesfoundation.org/Documents/one-early-success-story.pdf.
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level prevent risk sharing across occupations.4
To our knowledge, we are the first to use individual savings group member data
to study the flows of credit within rural credit markets. The existing literature on in-
formal transfers in rural villages has mostly studied inter-personal, non-intermediated
transfers. That literature has argued that poor households are part of a complex web of
financial transactions involving both borrowing and lending (Udry, 1994, Collins et al.,
2009), where they are often net recipients of transfers from the rich (e.g., Fafchamps
and Gubert, 2007). Such informal transfers can be explained by altruism (e.g., Foster
and Rosenzweig, 2001, Alger and Weibull, 2010), social pressure to help poorer com-
munity members (e.g., Jakiela and Ozier, 2016), or as a way to extend and strengthen
a person’s social sphere (Guérin et al., 2011, Shipton, 2007). While financial transac-
tions within savings groups do not operate completely outside a moral economy subject
to “interpersonal bonds of dependence and domination” (Guérin et al., 2011), we think
that these elements are not of primary importance in our context: loans from SGs
have to be repaid with interest (between 3% and 20% per month), and borrowers in
the savings group are borrowing from the group and not from any specific individual.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on poverty traps, as well as a more
specific literature on savings groups. Our result that the rich lend to the poor is con-
sistent with papers questioning the existence of technology-based poverty traps (e.g.,
Kraay and McKenzie, 2014), and with theories of poverty based on behavioral biases
(Banerjee and Mullainathan, 2010, Bernheim et al., 2015, Canidio, 2015). Our evi-
dence is also consistent with Beaman et al. (2014), who show that the marginal return
of capital for Malian farmers is negatively correlated with baseline farm revenue.5
Our paper belong to a nascent literature studying the ability of SGs to intermediate
financial flows. It complements work by Cassidy and Fafchamps (2015) showing that
sorting patterns within Malawian SGs are consistent with models where present-biased
commitment savers supply funds to time consistent borrowers. A relevant finding in
that paper is that people belonging to the same profession tend to join the same
savings group. They interpret this result as “suggesting unrealized intermediation
possibilities,” as members of the same occupation category will have similar demands
for loans. While we lack measures of present bias, we find no difference in the patterns
of borrowing within and across occupations. One interpretation of this result is that
4 Of course, another possibility is that we fail to detect risk sharing across profession due to data
limitations.
5 Interestingly, the recent literature on microfinance finds that baseline characteristics of potential
borrowers such as wealth do not predict microfinance’s take-up (Banerjee, Karlan, and Zinman,
2015). This is consistent with the model in Beaman et al. (2014) where microfinance institutions are
screening out low-wealth but high marginal-return borrowers. The fact that we see these correlations
in SGs suggests that SGs are not screening low wealth participants to the same degree.
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SGs are unable to smooth profession-specific income shocks, which may explain the
sorting pattern observed by Cassidy and Fafchamps (2015).
2 Background on SGs
SGs are community-based financial institutions, composed of around 30 members,
who meet weekly, save with and borrow from the group. During the first meeting,
members agree on the interest rate charged on loans, the maximum weekly savings
level allowed, the length of the group’s operating cycle, and the possible loan uses.
Each week, members contribute funds to the group, repay previous loans, and request
new loans. Loan amounts are capped at 3 times the amount saved by the borrower
within the group. Hence, a member who wishes to borrow must first save. Funds that
are not lent out are stored in a safe and can be lent out in the future. Finally, at the
end of the operating cycle of the group, all loans are repaid and each member receives
back the amount saved with the group, plus a return on her savings that depends on
the total interest payment collected by the group. After the share out, the composition
of the group may change, and a new cycle may start. SGs are, in general, effective
at ensuring that borrowers repay—in our study groups, only 3% of members were in
arrears—and at generating positive return on savings—around 12% in our data.
Our study SGs were created in 2013 in the context of the expansion of a large
anti-poverty program to 90 rural villages in Uganda. The aim of this program was to
identify ultra-poor, vulnerable households and invite them to join newly created SGs,
together with other members invited from the community at large. Hence, our groups
are inclusive of the most vulnerable households of the community.6
3 Data
Our data consist of individual savings and borrowing decisions over one operating
cycle of all members of our study SGs (approximately 3000 people). These data were
collected during a financial review of the groups carried out by experienced auditors at
the end of the groups’ first operating cycle. We consider only members who contributed
a positive amount and who did not drop out.7 For each participant, we first calculate
the total amount saved, the total amount borrowed, and the number of loans taken
over the cycle. We then construct two measures of net borrowing: the total amount
6 See Burlando and Canidio (2015) for more a detailed description of the functioning of SGs, of
the protocol followed for the formation of the study SGs, and of the data collected.
7 Less than 1% of the sample (112 observations) were recorded as dropouts. Note that financial
records also include gender as the sole characteristic of the participant.
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borrowed as a fraction of accumulated savings (i.e., the loans-to-savings ratio), and
whether the loans-to-savings ratio is smaller than 1 (i.e., the member is a net lender
to the group).
In addition to the collection of financial records, we also have household survey
information from a sample of 1,500 participants (out of the 3,000 members) collected
shortly after groups were formed.8 The data contain information on household income,
various measures of asset ownership, gender of the respondent, main occupation—also
called Income Generating Activity (IGA)—and other household characteristics. We
summarized the measures of asset ownership with an index using principal component
analysis; additional measures of wealth are land owned (measured in acres) and an
housing-structure index.9
Summary statistics and loan usage Table 1 reports the summary statistics of the
SG participants. The table reports all data from the sample interviewed at baseline
(first two columns) as well as financial outcomes from the universe of savings groups
participants (last two columns).10 Outcome variables and gender composition are
nearly identical across the two samples. Two thirds of the account holders in the
group are women. On average, members saved almost 100,000 UGX over the cycle,
which is approximately $40, and borrowed an average of 150,000 UGX ($56). Most
participants (90%) borrow at least once from the group. This indicates an important
fact of lending patterns in SGs: most members participate in both sides of the market
(i.e., they are both borrowers and lenders)11 Finally, the loan to savings ratio is 1.67,
meaning that on average group members were able to borrow US$1.6 for each $1 they
saved, which is possible because repaid loans can be lent out again.
Summary statistics of the participants at baseline indicate that most members
do not participate in formal financial markets and are generally excluded from most
financial services. 7% report having a savings account, 14% a mobile money account,
and 37% belong to some other type of informal financial group (including ROSCAs,
savings groups, or insurance groups). These are low levels of financial integration
by local standards: for instance, surveys carried out by FINSCOPE in Uganda in
8 With perhaps a slight abuse of the term, we refer to these data as baseline, even though they
were collected after groups formed. For a subset of participants we had some information prior to
group formation (Burlando and Canidio, 2015).
9 Unfortunately, we do not have information on the variability of income or the presence of income
shocks.
10 The interview sample reported here is restricted to observations for which all characteristics are
available (i.e., not missing).
11 In this regard, SG operations resemble patterns observed in inter-personal exchanges, in which
households are often both lenders and borrowers. See Udry (1994), Collins et al. (2009), Guérin et al.
(2011).
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2013 (around the same time as our study) found that 17% of rural populations had
access to formal bank accounts, 52% had access to formal non-bank accounts (including
mobile accounts), and 74% participated in informal finance. More generally, our group
participants are very vulnerable: 61% report being food insecure, and 35% report some
type of disability or chronic disease at home. On the employment end, two thirds of
household report being engaged in some farming, and a quarter are casual workers
or informally employed. 6% of households report having no sources of income, and
presumably rely on transfers or savings for survival.
An important issue is how loans generated in the savings groups are used, and how
this use vary by wealth levels. We have data on the use of loans for approximately 16%
of the sample (500 participants) who were interviewed at endline in 2014, after the
cycle ended. Unfortunately, the interviewed sample includes only the most vulnerable
participants in the savings groups, and as such it is not a representative of the overall
membership. Nonetheless, for illustrative purposes only, we show how loans are utilized
(Table 2). We divide this group into a “relative rich” group (asset index above 1 stan-
dard deviation) and a “relative poor” group (asset index below 1 standard deviation)
and report how these two groups used loans. For simplicity, responses are aggregated
into 17 categories, which are further grouped into five supra-categories (productive
investments, consumption of durable/non-durable goods, ex-ante risk sharing, ex-post
shock smoothing, and other uses). On average, 34% of respondents report using loans
for productive investments, 45% for school fees, and 22% report using loans to absorb
other shocks. The two subsamples are very similar, but the poorest are more likely to
devoting a portion of their loan for consumption of durables and non-durables (18.5%
vs. 6.8%). The qualitative evidence thus suggests that loans are predominantly used
for investments and to smooth shocks (including paying school fees).
4 Analysis
4.1 Financial flows within savings groups
Using our baseline sample, we regress our measures of savings, borrowing, and net
borrowing position on the baseline characteristics of the participants in our study
groups, including our wealth index. Because we are interested in the flow of capital
within each savings group, we provide within-group estimates by using SG fixed effects
throughout. The estimated coefficients will indicate how initial wealth correlates with
financial outcomes.
Table 3 regresses cumulative savings amounts, cumulative loan amounts, and the
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number of loans taken using OLS.12 We find that wealth is strongly associated with
savings: one standard deviation in wealth increases savings by 8,600 UGX, which is
8.7% of average amount saved. On the other hand, the asset index is not associated
with amount borrowed or the number of loans taken. Interestingly, once we control for
wealth, income per capita does not predict savings and borrowing. Some of the other
variables are associated with savings and borrowing in expected ways. For instance,
higher values in the scale of need (“assessor scale”) are associated with less savings, and
unemployed members are able to borrow significantly less than the otherwise employed.
Finally, members that are active in financial markets (i.e., they have a bank account)
borrow more often and have 40,000 UGXmore in loans. We fail to detect an association
with other variables. Controlling for wealth, we find that measures of vulnerability
(like disability or food insecurity), income, or household size do not affect savings and
borrowing amounts.
We now turn to our measures of net lending in Table 4. Neither wealth, nor any
other preexisting characteristic other than being unemployed, predicts the likelihood
of borrowing (column 1). On the intensive margin instead, initial wealth does matter:
two standard deviation increase in asset ownership reduces the loans-to-savings ratio by
0.23 points—14% of the average loans-to-savings ratio—and increases the likelihood of
being a net lender by 6.6 percentage points—14.7% of the average. This result supports
the idea that capital flows from asset-rich to asset-poor participants. Most of the other
explanatory variables are not statistically significant, although it is noteworthy that
women borrow less on average and farmers are more likely to be net lenders.13 The
fact that employment sector does not predict financial behavior will be the subject of
further discussion in the next subsection.
While table 4 indicates that there is a negative relationship between wealth and
borrowing, the relationship could be highly non-monotonic. For instance, members
who are extremely poor may be net lender. The top panel of figure 1 presents the
nonlinear relationship between wealth and the loan-to-savings ratio, and shows that
the relationship is flat for wealth levels below 2 standard deviations, and then strongly
decreasing for higher wealth levels. The bottom panel provides that same nonlinear
relationship after controlling for all covariates and group fixed effects. It can be seen
that the relationship between wealth and net borrowing position is weakly monotonic.
12 We also estimated column 3 using Poisson estimation and find effects similar in size and statistical
significance.
13 Results are robust to several alternative specifications, such as the exclusion of covariates. The
results also do not change if we use alternative wealth indices that include only animals, durable
assets, or productive assets, or if the index is measured as a deviation from the group average.
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4.2 Risk sharing across occupations
So far we presented evidence that funds flow from rich to poor, and that farming
households are more likely to be net lenders. A related point is whether, within savings
groups, financial behavior vary systematically within occupations. For instance, it may
be that participants who work in the same sector are buffeted by correlated shocks
or correlated income, such that their borrowing and savings needs are also correlated.
Table 1 does not address this issue, as certain occupation may face a positive shock in
some groups while facing a negative shock in another.
We provide some insights on the flow of funds within occupations by using a dyadic
regression framework. The idea behind our dyadic regressions is as follows: Consider
two members of the same savings groups who are engaged in the same occupation.14 If
their income is correlated (for instance, their harvests depend on the level of rainfall at
a specific location), then they will have a similar net demand for loans. As such, they
will tend to be in the same borrowing side, and have more similar loan to savings ratios,
than two members who are engaged in separate occupations. With this idea in mind,
within each savings group g, we compare lending positions for pairs of members (i, j)
who share the same occupation against those pairs who have different occupations:
yijg = β0 + β1Same Occupationij +Wij + δg + εij (1)
We restrict the sample to those participants with baseline information. The data
consist of member pairs in a savings group with outcome variable yij being the absolute
difference in loan to savings ratio, |lsri − lsrj|, or an indicator variable for whether
i and j are both net lenders or net borrowers. The main explanatory variable of
interest is whether i and j share the same occupation; as a robustness check, we also
create dummy variables for each occupation separately. If groups allocate funds to
smooth correlated shocks, then we would expect Same Occupationij to be negatively
related to the loan to savings ratio (β1 negative) and positively related with being
both net borrowers or net lenders (β1 positive). We also control for whether the pair
is unemployed.
Note that our pair (dyad) data are undirectional: yij = yji. Thus, following
standard dyadic regression literature (i.e., Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007, Cassidy and
Fafchamps, 2015), we control for a set of matrix of covariates Wij which includes both
the absolute difference and the sum of two variables X (i.e., |Xi −Xj| and Xi +Xj).
In our regression we control for the wealth index, land holdings, housing index and
income. In addition, the covariate matrix is block diagonal: we consider all possible
14 We do not consider the unemployed to be employed in any sector.
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Ng(Ng − 1) combinations within each saving group, and do not consider pairs (i, j)
across groups. Following common practice when using dyadic data, we cluster our
standard errors by using a dyadic-robust variance estimator developed by Fafchamps
and Gubert, 2007 (see also Cameron and Miller, 2014). Our results are robust when
clustering at the group level.
We report summary statistics from the 11,350 dyads in table 5. The likelihood
that two randomly selected members of a group share the same occupation is 67.5%;
this is mostly driven by the fact that 53% of pairs are made of farmers. Only 10% and
8% of pairs are composed of casual workers and petty traders respectively. Looking at
outcome variables, the average absolute difference in loan to savings ratio is 1.7, and
the likelihood that a pair are either both net borrowers or both net lenders is 56%.
In table 6, we report estimates from equation (1), with and without dyad controls.
In columns 1-2 we report loan to savings ratio differentials when the explanatory
variable is having the same occupation, in columns 3 and 4 we split this by occupation
category. Coefficient estimates are quite stable, but in no case they are significant.
Moreover, the estimates on being both farming have the wrong sign–they are positive–
although again the standard errors are very large. We run the same analysis for being
in the same lending position; again, we find no large or significant estimates.
While our failure to observe a correlation between borrowing positions within oc-
cupations may be due to data limitations,15 it is suggestive that whatever existing
correlation is low. This could be driven by a number of factors. First, savings groups
may be unable to provide funds to everyone at a time of high demand (say, before
harvest among farmers). Lending is restricted to the cash available in the safe box,
and this may be insufficient to cover all needs; in that case, rationing can occur, with
some would-be borrowers unable to borrow. A second possibility is that loan demand
within occupations is not more correlated than loan demand across occupations. Note
that the latter possibility would be consistent with Cassidy and Fafchamps (2015),
who find that people belonging to the same occupation tend to join the same savings
group. This finding is more easily explainable if occupation does not predict loan
demand, and matching on occupation has some other positive benefit (for instance,
allows members within the same occupation to monitor each other more effectively).
15 Specifically, our measurement of financial outcomes is at the end of the cycle, and it may be that
financial needs vary across time within occupation, but over the course of the cycle any difference in
the borrowing needs across occupations average to the same level. In addition, it is possible that our
employment measures may be too broad. Although we do find surprising that results are insignificant
for the more narrowly defined “farming” category.
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5 Conclusion
Interpersonal borrowing and lending play an important role in village economies in
developing countries, from financing investments and income generating activities, to
smoothing both expected and unexpected shocks, to establishing and reinforcing social
bonds within the community. Economists have long been studying how capital flows
through interpersonal transfers, but less is known about intermediated flows. This
paper aims at filling this gap by studying the allocation of financial resources within
savings groups in rural Uganda. Using detailed data on savings and borrowing choices
of members of 104 savings groups, we find that loanable funds move from the (relative)
rich to the (relative) poor. This result has two implications. First, SGs appear effective
at financial intermediation, because they redistribute loanable funds. Second, it lends
further support to the idea that the poor have better use of funds than the rich, which
is consistent with the idea that technology poverty traps are not present in the context
we study.
We also seek evidence that flows are used to smooth occupation specific shocks.
The fact that we are unable to find any raises the possibility that savings groups are
not able to smooth out these kinds of shocks, which may explain why groups are not
very diversified in terms of occupations. We caution that the lack of evidence may be
due to limitations with our data; future work with more detailed data is needed to
fully address this matter.
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Financial outcomes (from audits) --end of first operating cycle
Cumulative savings (UGX) 99,320           57,665           98,590        60,118        
Cumulative loans (UGX) 153,605         169,041        151,089      167,986      
Likelihood of borrowing 0.90 0.31 0.88 0.32
Loan to savings ratio 1.67 1.65 1.63 1.62
Net lender 0.44 0.50 0.45 0.50
Female member 0.67 0.47 0.64 0.48
Missing gender 0.10 0.31 0.13 0.34
Member characteristics (from baseline) 
Asset index -0.07 0.93
Housing structure index -0.11 1.35
Land owned (acres) 2.13 4.67
Income per capita ('000 UGX) 8.31 11.68
Has bank account 0.07 0.25
Has mobile account 0.14 0.34
Other savings groups 0.37 0.84
Disability in household 0.35 0.48
Food insecure 0.61 0.49
Assessor scale 1.61 0.78
Access to latrines 0.84 0.36
HHMembers 6.63 3.08
IGA==Casual Labor 0.25 0.43
IGA==Farming 0.66 0.47
IGA==Formal employment 0.03 0.16
IGA==Informal 
Employment/Petty 0.22 0.42
IGA==Others 0.03 0.18
Unemployed 0.06 0.23
N
Baseline interview subsample All SG members
1457 2926
Tab. 1: Summary statistics
Data on financial outcomes comes from detailed audit records collected by SCORE field officers at
the end of the first lending cycle. Information on gender of the account holder was obtained from
group registries. Information on other member characteristics comes from interviews carried out after
groups were formed. The sample is restricted to observations with nonmissing values in the covariates.
Assessor scale: interviewer’s general impression of the interviewee. Scale goes from 0 (in good
situation) to 3 (critical situation). IGA: Income generating activities. Housing structure index: index
composed of materials for walls, floor and roofs, as well as type of lighting in the house. Asset index:
index composed of 25 separate household assets.
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Loan uses mentioned by respondent at 
endline Number
Fraction of 
respondents Number
Fraction of 
respondents
Start a new business 0 0.0% 33 7.7%
Buy livestock 5 8.5% 11 2.6%
Buy farm input 7 11.9% 29 6.8%
Restock 2 3.4% 9 2.1%
Buy or rent land 0 0.0% 2 0.5%
Invest in existing business 7 11.9% 59 13.8%
Productive investments 21 35.6% 143 33.5%
Consumption 3 5.1% 54 12.6%
Buy hhld durable 1 1.7% 20 4.7%
Buy other durables 0 0.0% 5 1.2%
Durable and nondurable goods consumption 4 6.8% 79 18.5%
Cerimony 2 3.4% 8 1.9%
Gifts to others 0 0.0% 1 0.2%
Risk sharing 2 3.4% 9 2.1%
Health problem 10 16.9% 63 14.8%
Unemployment 0 0.0% 2 0.5%
Temporary difficulties 3 5.1% 32 7.5%
Shocks 13 22.0% 97 22.7%
School fees 29 49.2% 194 45.4%
Repay a loan 1 1.7% 19 4.4%
Home improvements 1 1.7% 12 2.8%
Other uses 31 52.5% 225 52.7%
Wealth>1 st. dev 
(N=59)
Wealth<1 st. dev 
(N=427)
Tab. 2: Use of loans among a subsample of participants
Data from endline interviews of vulnerable group participants. See Burlando and Canidio (2016) for
in depth description of the endline interview process. Wealth index is from baseline. Because people
can report multiple uses for the same loan, the sum of the reported uses can exceed 100%
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(1) (2) (3)
Cumulative 
savings
Cumulative 
loan amounts 
Number of 
loans
Asset index 8,632*** 1,089 0.012
(2,002) (6,161) (0.048)
Housing structure index 1,581 -3,155 -0.019
(1,136) (4,653) (0.032)
Land owned 27 759 -0.008
(305) (1,299) (0.006)
Income per capita ('000 UGX) 71 174 -0.001
(147) (539) (0.003)
Has bank account 6,080 40,464* 0.500**
(7,638) (20,640) (0.249)
Has mobile account 2,644 17,421 -0.054
(4,694) (15,990) (0.123)
Other savings groups 912 -241 0.021
(1,927) (5,248) (0.074)
Female member 2,564 -5,883 0.110
(3,499) (11,357) (0.085)
Missing gender -3,201 19,566 -0.312
(7,747) (23,751) (0.193)
Disability in household -545 -5,559 0.031
(3,189) (9,696) (0.092)
Food insecure 1,596 5,803 0.076
(3,277) (10,572) (0.086)
Assessor scale -3,355* 5,953 0.071
(1,829) (6,435) (0.050)
Access to latrines 3,089 20,150** 0.054
(3,331) (8,569) (0.124)
HHMembers 46 2,252 0.018
(462) (1,526) (0.014)
IGA==Casual Labor -4,368 -10,276 0.050
(3,484) (12,517) (0.135)
IGA==Farming 3,171 -7,861 -0.002
(4,412) (11,099) (0.121)
IGA==Formal employment -12,254 9,171 -0.147
(8,981) (27,038) (0.259)
-214 3,827 0.055
(4,133) (14,263) (0.092)
IGA==Others -17,794** -16,264 0.135
(7,964) (21,203) (0.150)
Unemployed -6,627 -27,776* -0.081
(6,399) (15,661) (0.189)
Savings group fixed effect YES YES YES
Observations 1,457 1,457 1,380
R-squared 0.471 0.337 0.544
Standard errors clustered at the group level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
IGA==Informal Employment/Petty 
Business
Tab. 3: Savings and borrowing amounts within savings groups
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(1) (2) (3)
Borrowed 
any amount
loan to 
savings ratio Net lender
Asset index -0.003 -0.112** 0.033*
(0.010) (0.052) (0.018)
Housing structure index -0.007 -0.064 0.001
(0.009) (0.044) (0.014)
Land owned -0.000 0.010 0.003
(0.002) (0.024) (0.002)
Income per capita ('000 UGX) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.005) (0.001)
Has bank account 0.049 0.102 -0.008
(0.033) (0.178) (0.058)
Has mobile account 0.015 0.081 -0.017
(0.027) (0.167) (0.053)
Other savings groups 0.022 0.036 -0.021
(0.015) (0.054) (0.018)
Female member 0.002 -0.266** 0.055
(0.021) (0.130) (0.033)
Missing gender -0.007 0.406 0.001
(0.073) (0.250) (0.090)
Disability in household 0.001 0.043 -0.010
(0.019) (0.109) (0.035)
Food insecure 0.016 0.031 -0.004
(0.018) (0.112) (0.029)
Assessor scale 0.007 0.101 -0.025
(0.012) (0.066) (0.019)
Access to latrines -0.004 0.029 -0.018
(0.028) (0.120) (0.038)
HHMembers 0.004 0.014 -0.005
(0.003) (0.015) (0.005)
IGA==Casual Labor -0.015 0.004 0.036
(0.024) (0.121) (0.042)
IGA==Farming -0.004 -0.149 0.068*
(0.025) (0.096) (0.039)
IGA==Formal employment -0.008 0.109 0.054
(0.054) (0.205) (0.103)
0.005 -0.009 0.030
(0.025) (0.124) (0.038)
IGA==Others 0.014 0.106 -0.049
(0.040) (0.209) (0.066)
Unemployed -0.114* -0.184 0.072
(0.060) (0.300) (0.062)
Savings group fixed effects YES YES YES
Observations 1,457 1,456 1,457
R-squared 0.266 0.242 0.201
Standard errors clustered at the group level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
IGA==Informal Employment/Petty 
Business
Tab. 4: Net financial position within savings groups
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Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Same occupation 0.68 0.47
Both in casual work 0.10 0.29
Both in farming 0.54 0.50
Both in formal emplyment 0.00 0.04
Both in informal employment/petty business 0.08 0.27
Both in other (unspecified) 0.00 0.06
Not employed (control variable) 0.01 0.10
Absolute difference in loan to savings ratio 1.51 1.58
Both net borrower/net lender 0.56 0.50
Asset index 0.84 0.81
Housing structure index 0.88 1.10
Income per capita 8.09 13.39
Land owned 2.21 5.81
Asset index 16.39 17.53
Housing structure index -0.17 1.45
Income per capita -0.28 2.33
Land owned 4.44 7.28
N (dyads)
Outcome variables 
Controls: Absolute value of difference: 
Controls: Sum 
Occupation
11,350
Tab. 5: Summary statistics: dyadic observations
Dyads created from the 1,457 observations with baseline information (see table 1). Only observations
(i, j) reported; observations (j, i) ommitted.
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Fig. 1: Loans-to-savings ratio and asset index; raw relationship (top panel) and con-
trolling for covariates and group fixed effects (bottom panel)
